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ALL ABOARD THE BANDWAGON!: THE
UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE AFTERMATH OF JAFFEE v. REDMOND
INTRODUCTION
In Jaffee v. Redmond,' the Supreme Court may have raised more
questions than it resolved. Jaffee involved a licensed clinical social
worker's claim of privilege to avoid compelled disclosure of client
confidences in a section 1983 federal civil rights violation claim and
a pendent state wrongful death action.2 Although the Court
1. 116S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
2. See id. at 1925. In 1991, Hoffman Estates, Illinois police officer Mary Lu Redmond
responded to a "fight in progress" call at an apartment complex. See id. As Redmond arrived at
the scene, witnesses approached her, shouting that a stabbing had just occurred in one of the
apartments. See id. She noticed two men running from the building. See id. According to
Redmond, one of the men, Ricky Allen, brandished a butcher knife and ignored her repeated
requests to stop. See id. To Redmond, it appeared that Allen was preparing to stab the man he
was chasing. See id at 1925-26. Redmond fired her weapon, killing Allen and igniting a hostile
confrontation with the crowd that had gathered at the scene. See Id. at 1926.
Following the shooting, two critical developments arose. First, Redmond participated in
counseling sessions with a state-licensed clinical social worker, who worked for the Village of
Hoffian Estates in an employee assistance program. See id. Second, Allen's relatives instituted
state wrongful death and Section 1983 actions, alleging that Redmond violated Allen's
constitutional rights by using excessive force. See id. During pretrial discovery, plaintiffs
sought access to the licensed clinical social worker's notes. See id. The social worker
strenuously refused disclosure, invoking the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See id. The
district court judge denied the social worker's claim of privilege and ordered production. See id.
Both Redmond and her social worker ignored the order. See id. At trial, the district judge
instructed the jury that because no legal justification supported the social worker's refusal to
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recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence,3 its opinion offered little insight about the
categories of mental health professionals to whom the privilege could
apply.' In dictum, the Court declared that confidential
communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists
would clearly fall within the privilege.' Acknowledging that the
privilege's rationale could apply to other psychotherapeutic
relationships, the Court extended the privilege to the licensed clinical
social worker at issue in Jaffee.6
Based on the reasoning underlying this extension, however, other
mental health practitioners now have grounds for advocating further
enlargement of the privilege to cover their own professional
affiliations. In fact, several professional associations advocated an
extension of the psychotherapist privilege even before the Jaffee
Court announced its existence. The National Association of Social
turn over her notes, the jury could infer that their contents were unfavorable to Redmond. See
id. The jury awarded plaintiffs a total of $545,000. See id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to
protect the confidential communications between Redmond and her social worker. See Jaffee v.
Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995). Although the Seventh Circuit articulated its
recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, it limited the privilege's application by
creating a balancing test. See id. The privilege would not apply, the Seventh Circuit noted, if
"the evidentiary need for the [information] ... outweighs [the] patient's privacy interest." Id.
3. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, in
relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
4. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (stating that "[b]ecause this is the first case in which we
have recognized a psychotherapist privilege, it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its
fll contours in a way that would 'govern all conceivable future questions in this area') (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)),
5. See id. at 1931 (stating that "[a]ll agree that a psychotherapist privilege covers
confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists").
6. See id. The Court stated that it had "no hesitation in concluding in this case that the
federal privilege should also extend to confidential communications made to licensed social
workers in the course of psychotherapy." Id. (emphasis added).
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Workers,7 the American Counseling Association,8 the Employee
Assistance Professionals Association,9 the American Association of
State Social Work Boards, °  the American Psychoanalytic
Association," and the National Network to End Domestic Violence 2
submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Court, urging recognition of a
psychotherapist privilege that would cover their communications
with their clients. 3 Immediately following the Jaffee decision, the
Employee Assistance Professionals Association stated publicly that
the Jaffee decision will place Employee Assistance counselors in a
good position to invoke the federal privilege on behalf of their
clients.14
Further, although Jaffee involved a "licensed clinical social
worker," the Court stated that this privilege would apply to
"confidential communications made to licensed social workers in the
course of psychotherapy."' 5 Many states which regulate social work
practice distinguish between "licensed clinical social workers" and
"licensed social workers," frequently requiring a higher level of
education and skill for the former.'6 In addition, because state statutes
7. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2012.
8. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2014.
9. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2015.
10. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 4042.
11. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2017.
12. Available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 2013.
13. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Counseling Association, available in
Westlaw, 1996 WL 2014.
[The] definitions of psychotherapy do not depend on the identity or credentials of the
therapist; rather, psychotherapy is defined by the nature of the treatment rendered, and
so should be the privilege. Moreover, most states do not limit their psychotherapist-
client privilege to psychiatrists and psychologists; the privileges extend to professional
mental health counselors and social workers who also provide psychotherapy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. See EAPA Provides Training on the Impact of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Ruling
Regarding Confidentiality, NAT'L REP. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, July 29, 1996, at 1 (quoting
Employee Assistance Professionals Association (EAPA) President George Cobbs, who stated
that the Jaffee decision will put EAPA counselors in a good position "to obtain protection [in
federal courts] for confidential communications related to mental and emotional disorders
suffered by its [sic] clients").
15. Jaffee, 116 S. CL at 1931. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text
16. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
1997]
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govern the licensure of social workers, educational and clinical
practice requirements vary considerably. 7 Thus, social workers in
states which require only minimal education and training for
licensure can arguably invoke the privilege. Yet, in light of the
Court's discussion of the "strict standards for licensure" that the state
demanded of the licensed clinical social worker in Jaffee, the Court
may not have intended this outcome. 8
Because the Court declined to specify the "full contours" of the
psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee,9 lower courts may become
entangled in peripheral evidentiary proceedings as various mental
health professionals and leniently-licensed social workers clamor to
claim the privilege. The central ambition of this Recent Development
is to define some contours of the psychotherapist privilege. Part I
analyzes the Court's rationale for extending the psychotherapist
privilege to licensed social workers.2" Part II demonstrates this
rationale's unintended flexibility in cases involving the kinds of
mental health professionals and social workers not addressed in
Jaffee. Finally, Part III proposes guidelines for courts to consider
when applying the psychotherapist privilege. Without strict,
judicially-imposed standards regulating the application of the
psychotherapist privilege, the inevitable efforts to broaden it will
eviscerate the time-honored rule that "privileges are to be narrowly
construed."2
17. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
18. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.15 (noting that had the petitioner filed the complaint in
an Illinois state court, Redmond's "claim of privilege would surely have been upheld, at least
with respect to the state wrongful death action").
19. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932. See supra note 4.
20. A discussion pertaining to the development of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, see
H. Carol Bernstein, Comment, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, 75 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 388 (1984); Lauren Messersmith, Comment,
Evidence: The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Under Federal Ride of Evidence 501, 23
WASHBURN L.J. 706 (1984).
21. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1937, (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (establishing the general rule that testimonial privileges are disfavored,
due to the predominant preference for utilizing all means to ascertain truth).
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I. EXTENSION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE TO LICENSED
SOCIAL WORKERS: THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Perhaps the most notable feature of the Court's discussion
regarding the extension of the privilege to licensed social workers is
its brevity. According to the Court, "[t]he reasons for recognizing a
privilege for treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists apply with
equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker."22 Thus, the
Court relied on the same, general policy objectives that the privilege
advances to justify its extension to licensed social workers. Further,
the Court briefly posited additional justifications, which specifically
pertain to the social work profession. A discussion of those
justifications follows.
A. The Necessity of an Atmosphere of Confidentiality
The Court acknowledged that effective psychotherapy requires a
haven of confidentiality. The possibility of a therapist's disclosure,
the Court opined, would frustrate treatment because a client may
withhold embarrassing or highly personal information that could be
critical to treatment.2 4 The possibility of disclosure may also prevent
troubled individuals from seeking treatment altogether.25 Therefore,
the Court concluded that a psychotherapist privilege serves important
private interests by protecting the sanctity of a confidential
therapeutic relationship, and important public interests by promoting
the use of mental health services.26
22. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
23. See id. at 1928-30.
24. See id. at 1928 (stating that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment").
25. See id. at 1929 (stating that "[tlhe psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest
by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a
mental or emotional problem").
26. See id. The Court spoke in terms of the psychotherapist privilege serving private and
public interest because new testimonial privileges "may be justified ... by a 'public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
the truth."' Id. at 1928 (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
1997]
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B. Lessons from State Law
The Court indicated that "the policy decisions of the States bear
on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one."27 Observing that
fifty state legislatures have enacted some form of the psychotherapist
privilege,28 the Court reasoned that a refusal to honor the privilege in
federal court would thwart the very purposes state law aimed to
serve.29 For example, the Court noted that had the Jaffee case
proceeded in state court and alleged only state law claims, the state
privilege statute would have protected the same client confidences
which the plaintiff sought to compel in this federal cause of action.30
Therefore, the Court's analysis suggests that state privilege law and
considerations of federal-state comity lend some shape to the
analysis."'
C. "Strict Standards ofLicensure"
The Court noted that the licensed clinical social worker at issue in
Jaffee satisfied the strict standards for licensure, and thus qualified as
a psychotherapist under state law.32 The Illinois statute to which the
Court referred recognizes a general privilege for communications
27. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30. See also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8
(1980); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 48-50 (observing that "the trend in state law toward divesting the
accused of the [spousal] privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony has special relevance
because the laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the
states"). Ironically, in Gillock, the Court determined that even though principles of comity
command careful consideration, comity yields where important federal interests are at stake.
See Gillock 445 U.S. at 373.
28. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 n. 11. See also infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text
for an analysis of the scope and coverage of state psychotherapist privileges.
29. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930 (stating that "any State's promise of confidentiality
would have little value if the patient were aware that the privilege would not be honored in a
federal court. Denial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state
legislation that was enacted to foster these confidential communications").
30. Seeid. at 1931 n.15.
31. Seeid. at1932.
32. Seeid. at 1931.
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with psychotherapists," which it defines to include licensed clinical
social workers as well as a number of other mental health providers.34
To qualify as a licensed clinical social worker in Illinois, a candidate
for licensure must possess a master's or doctoral degree from an
accredited institution and complete a specific number of hours of
supervised clinical professional experience subsequent to the
degree.35 Because the licensed clinical social worker in Jaffee
conformed to these state-established standards, the Court noted that
she qualified as a psychotherapist to whom state law granted the
privilege.36 The Court's reasoning suggests that state law determines,
by establishing licensure standards, the qualifications of those
eligible to invoke the privilege.
D. Fulfilling the Psychotherapeutic Function
The Court observed that licensed clinical social workers, like
psychiatrists and psychologists, perform psychotherapy.37  As
psychotherapists, they fulfill similar functions and serve similar
public goals.3" Consequently, the Court reasoned that a refusal to
extend the privilege to social workers would deprive certain clients of
the confidentiality that others enjoy.39 In this sense, the Court's
reasoning suggests that a "psychotherapist" privilege extends to those
who perform psychotherapy, irrespective of professional affiliation.
However, what constitutes "psychotherapy" remains unclear.40
33. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10 (West 1994).
34. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (West 1994).
35. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/9 (West 1994). Those who have a master's degree must
complete 3000 hours while those who have a doctor's degree must complete 2000 hours. See id.
36. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
37. See id. at 1930.
38. See id. at 1931. The Court also noted that because social work services typically cost
less, the clientele often includes poor people who cannot afford the services of psychiatrists or
psychologists, See id. Thus, even if discernible qualitative differences exist between the
psychotherapy offered by psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, the Court appeared
unwilling to make a distinction that would disadvantage a poorer class of mental health clients.
39. Seeid.at1931.
40. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term
,.psychotherapy."
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
362 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 52:355
Thus, the Court impliedly considered four factors: (1) the
importance of confidentiality in the performance and acquisition of
psychotherapy; (2) the class of professionals to whom state law
grants a psychotherapist privilege; (3) the professional licensure
requirements that state law demands; and finally, (4) the
psychotherapeutic function performed. The Court stated that the four
considerations alone were all that was necessary for their decision in
Jaffee.4' When applying the privilege in new contexts, lower courts
will need to look to the factors suggested in Jaffee. The application of
these factors, however, may actually undermine decisional certainty
about the scope of the privilege. Unfortunately, as the Court observed
in Upjohn Co. v. United States, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications
by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."'42
II. ROOM TO GROW: THE APPLICATION OF JAFFEE
The Court's reasoning for extending the psychotherapist privilege
to licensed social workers may prove unintentionally elastic. Using
the Court's analysis, other mental health providers have reasonable
grounds to invoke the psychotherapist privilege on behalf of their
clients, perhaps stretching it beyond the narrow bounds that typically
confine testimonial privileges. Yet, nothing in the Court's analysis
indicates that the privilege could not also extend to licensed family
therapists, licensed professional counselors, employee assistance
professionals, registered nurses, chemical dependency counselors,
pastoral counselors, or even volunteer domestic violence and rape
counselors. Thus, when applying Jaffee to novel claims of
psychotherapist privilege, federal courts will confront inevitable
difficulties.
A. The Incongruity and Breadth of State Privilege Statutes
The Jaffee Court emphasized that state law offers guidance on the
41. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
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question of whether to amend the coverage of an existing privilege."
State statutes, however, vary considerably with respect to the classes
of mental health providers covered by a testimonial privilege.'
Despite these variations, state psychotherapist privilege statutes,
particularly with regard to licensed social workers, fall into three
general categories.
1. No State Law Privilege for Social Workers/Privilege for Other
Mental Health Providers
In Jaffee, the Court mentioned a lack of federal-state comity as a
factor underlying the privilege's extension to a licensed clinical
social worker.45  Yet, several states recognize a form of
psychotherapist privilege that excludes licensed social workers, but
expressly includes other mental health providers.46 In these states,
comity disappears. On the one hand, the Jaffee decision renders
privileged certain communications that the state has not seen fit to
protect-such as communications with licensed social workers.47 On
43. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text. See generally Kerry L. Morse, Note, A
Uniform Testimonial Privilege for Mental Health Professionals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 741 (1990)
(discussing the "patchwork" of state privileges and calling for a uniform qualified privilege for
all mental health professionals).
45. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.15 (observing that if the plaintiff had filed the
wrongful death complaint in state court, Illinois' privilege statute would have prevented the
compelled disclosure of the client confidences).
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-42 (1995) (victim counselors); ALA. CODE § 34-8A-21
(1991) ("licensed professional counselors or certified counselor associate"); ALA. CODE § 34-
26-2 (1990) (providing for a testimonial privilege for licensed psychologists and licensed
psychiatrists); ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (Michie 1996) (psychologists and "psychological
associates"); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.400 (Michie 1996) (domestic violence and sexual assault
counselors); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R_ 504 (1985) (physicians); HAW. REv. STAT. § 626-1,
R. 504.1 (1985) (psychologists); HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1, R. 505.5 (Supp. 1996) (victim
counselors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.3 (1996) (addiction counselors); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-01-06.4 (1996) (any person providing diagnosis or treatment for physical, mental or
emotional condition); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945 (1982 & Supp. 1996) (school
counselors); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996) (sexual assault
counselors).
47. For example, under Jaffee, a licensed clinical social worker in the District of North
Dakota could invoke the psychotherapist privilege in federal court to resist the compelled
disclosure of client confidences, even though no similar protection would extend in a state
1997]
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the other hand, the Jaffee decision may not apply to communications
that state legislatures have deemed privileged-such as
communications with licensed counselors or domestic violence
counselors.48 In this way, state privilege statutes that exclude licensed
social workers, but not other professionals, provide strong
justification for extending the federal privilege to such professional
groups.
2. Statutory Privilege for Mental Health Providers, Including
Social Workers and Other Professionals
The justification for extending the privilege gathers particular
strength when considering those state privilege statutes that broadly
cover the gamut of mental health practice.49 Like the Illinois statute
discussed in Jaffee,5" these schemes recognize a privilege for
court. The Department of Justice, writing as amicus curiae, noted this potential anomaly in its
brief, which states:
In a case arising in [a state that does not recognize a privilege for licensed social
workers], there may ... be no basis to claim a federal court privilege; there would be
little reason for a federal court to attempt to protect the confidentiality of a relationship
that the State itself has not attempted to protect.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, available in Wvestlaw, 1996 WL 32788.
48. For example, the Alabama statute grants a privilege to licensed counselors but not to
licensed social workers. See ALA. CODE § 34-8A-21 (1991). Thus, in Alabama, a licensed
counselor may invoke the psychotherapist privilege in state court; whereas, in federal court,
client confidences remain vulnerable to disclosure because Jaffee does not expressly extend the
privilege to licensed counselors.
49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3283 (1992) ("behavioral health professional");
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010 (West 1995) ("psychotherapists"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1995)
("mental health professionals"); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.503 (1979 & Supp. 1996)
("psychotherapist"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West 1950 & Supp. 1995) ("counselor" or
"mental health professional'); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1, 335 (1995) ("mental health
practitioners"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (1995) (recognizing privilege between
clients and all persons certified under Chapter 330A, including certified mental health
practitioners); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("person licensed ... to
provide diagnosis, counseling, or treatment of a mental illness or emotional condition"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-60-113 ("mental health therapists") (1996); VT. tR EVID. 503 ("mental health
professional").
50. As discussed in Jaffee, Illinois provides for a general psychotherapist privilege, see
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/10 (West 1994), which includes licensed clinical social workers. See
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (West 1994).
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"psychotherapists," a term that includes specific professional
designations." Although these statutes include licensed social
workers, 2 they vary with respect to other mental health professionals.
Some states define "psychotherapist" or "mental health professional"
to encompass licensed marital and family therapists,53 rape or
domestic violence counselors,54 licensed counselors,55 substance
abuse counselors,56 psychiatric registered nurses,57 and pastoral
counselors.5 In light of the Jaffee Court's reference to federal-state
comity, these other "psychotherapists," who enjoy a statutory grant of
privilege commensurate with that afforded licensed social workers,
can reasonably argue that the federal privilege should also cover their
professional relationships.
51, See supra note 49.
52. See, e g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-3293 (1992) (certified social workers); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1010(c) (West 1995) (licensed clinical social worker); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2001(11)(C) (1995) (licensed social workers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(l)(a)(3) (West 1979
& Supp. 1997) (licensed or certified clinical social workers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West
Supp. 1996) (licensed social workers); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1-300 (1995) (person certified as
a social worker pursuant to § 71-1-301); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:16(d) (1995) (licensed
clinical social workers); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(A)(1)(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996)
(licensed master social worker or licensed independent social worker); UTAH R. EVID. 506(a)(3)
(1996) (clinical of certified social workers); VT. R. EVID. 503(a)(5) (Michie Supp. 1996) (a
social worker with demonstrated competence in the treatment of mental illness).
53. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010(e) (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2001(1 1)(D)
(1995); FLA. STAT. Ann. § 90.503(1XaX3) (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10
(West Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1-299 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:16(f)
(1995); UTAH R EVID. 506(aX3).
54. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §6-2001(11)(E) (1995) (rape counselors who have
undergone at least 40 hours of training and serve under the direction of a licensed social worker,
nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist).
55. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1-302 (1995).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(1)(a)(4) (West Supp. 1997) (mental health
counselors primarily engaged in the treatment of substance abuse); UTAH R. EVID. 506 (mental
health therapist includes persons engaged in the treatment of alcohol and drug addictions).
57. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2001(1 1)(F) (1995) (licensed professional psychiatric
nurses); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-I 1-95(AXI)(d) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) (clinical nurse
specialist in the field of mental health); UTAH R EVID. 506 (advanced practice registered nurse
designated as a psychiatric specialist).
58. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:16-C (1995) (religiously affiliated pastoral
counselors).
1997]
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3. Specific Grant of Privilege to Licensed Social Workers and
Other Professionals
Many states recognize a specific social worker-client privilege. 9
The vast majority of states that recognize such a privilege also
recognize a privilege for certain other mental health providers:
licensed counselors, 60 employee assistance counselors,6' marital and
family therapists,62 or psychiatric registered nurses.63 Unlike the
59. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-46-107 (Michie 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-146q (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-
21(7) (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-6-1 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6315 (1992)
(creating a privilege, yet providing that privilege dissipates when information relates to a
criminal act or violation of law); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7005 (West 1988) (creating privilege, yet privilege dissipates if
court deems that disclosure is "necessary to the proper administration ofjustice"); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-121 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135B (West
1996) (creating privilege, but providing for disclosure if judge determines that the interests of
justice are more important than preserving the social worker-client relationship); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(1)(g) (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-53-29 (1995); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 337.636 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-22-401 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:15BB-13 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-31-24 (Michie 1993); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4508 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.7 (1996) (creating privilege, but
providing for disclosure if court compels in the interest of justice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.02(G) (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing for waiver if a court determines
in camera that the information is not germane to the social worker-client relationship); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.250 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-39.1-4 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-26-30
(Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-107 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.19.180 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (providing elimination
of privilege in response to a subpoena from a court of law); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-12 (1993 &
Supp. 1996); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 905.05 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-109 (Michie
1996).
60. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-27-308 (Michie 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 3013 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21(8) (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-5810 (1992); LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510(A)(4)(c) (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-30-17 (1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 337.540 (vest 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-23-301 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 61-9A-27 (Michie 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.8 (1996) (providing for exception, if a
court determines that disclosure is necessary to the proper administration ofjustice); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.02(G)(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996) (providing for exception, if
court determines in camera that information is not germane to counselor-client relationship);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.262 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-32-27 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992); V. VA. CODE § 30-31-13 (1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-109 (Michie 1996).
61. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(n) (West 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-
42-115 (Supp. 1996).
62. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21(8) (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-9-1 (West
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Illinois statute in Jaffee, the privilege is not derivative of a general
psychotherapist privilege.' Rather, profession-specific privileges
reflect a legislative judgment that the communications arising out of
specific relationships merit particular protection. For this reason, the
policy decisions of the states should, in the words of the Jaffee Court,
"bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new
privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one.
65
B. Not-So Strict Standards of State Licensure
The Court noted that the licensed clinical social worker qualified
as a "psychotherapist" under Illinois law because she "satisfied the
strict standards for licensure [as a licensed clinical social worker]."'
The Court's reference to licensure standards could suggest its
adherence to the requirements of professional expertise typically
associated with occupation-based testimonial privileges.67 Yet, by
stating that the privilege would apply to merely "licensed social
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6410 (1992); MO. ANN. STAT. § 337.736 (West Supp. 1996);
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.247 (Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:8B-29 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.5 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-22-114 (1990 & Supp.
1996).
63. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21(7) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-1091 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 1986 & Supp.
1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04(1)(f)
(West 1997).
64. See supra note 52-59 and accompanying text.
65. 116 S. Ct. at 1929-30.
66. Id. at 1931 n. 15. See supra text accompanying note 35 (discussing Illinois licensure
requirements).
67. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1938 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia expressed concern
that the Jaffee majority strayed from the professional standards that accompany testimonial
privileges. Noting that Illinois issues licenses to certain social workers who have only
undergraduate degrees, Justice Scalia stated:
With due respect, it does not seem to me that any of this training is comparable in its
rigor (or indeed in the precision of its subject) to the training of the other experts
(lawyers) to whom this Court has accorded a privilege, or even of the experts
(psychiatrists and psychologists) to whom the Advisory Committee and this Court
proposed extension of a privilege in 1972.
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workers in the course of psychotherapy,"68 the Court may have
inadvertently defied the heightened expertise that the psychotherapist
privilege warrants.
States differ regarding the minimum qualifications for licensure.
Some states require only a bachelor's degree. 9 For example,
Alabama will issue a license to any person who passes an
examination and has a bachelor's degree in a human service field.7"
By contrast, other states require a master's or doctoral degree,
passing marks on a written examination, and significant supervised
experience.7"
68. Id. at 1931 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-30-22(5)(a) (1991) ("bachelor social worker" license
requires bachelor's degree in a human service field and passing a written examination); IND.
CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-5-I (West 1993) ("certificate in social work" requires bachelor's degree
and two years experience in the practice of social work); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 19-
302 (1994) ("social work associate" license requires bachelor's degree from accredited school);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-53-13 (1995) (license as a "social worker" requires bachelor's degree
and passing a written examination); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-31-9 (Michie 1993) ("baccalaureate
social worker" requires bachelor's degree and passing a written examination); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 43-41-04 (1993) ("licensed social worker" requires bachelor's degree in social work or
social welfare and passing a written examination); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4757.28 (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1997) ("licensed social worker" requires bachelor's degree in social work or,
prior to 1992, an approved closely related program and passing a written examination); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-63-70 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) ("licensed baccalaureate social worker"
requires bachelor's degree in social work or human service field and passing an examination);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-26-15 (Michie 1994) ("licensed social worker" requires bachelor's
degree and passing a written examination); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 457.08 (West 1995) ("social
work certificate" requires bachelor's degree in social work program and passing a written
examination).
70. See ALA. CODE § 34-30-22(5)(a) (1991) (establishing qualifications for a "licensed
bachelor social worker"). To qualify as a "licensed graduate social worker" in Alabama, a
candidate must pass an examination and possess a master's degree in social work. See § 34-30-
22(5)(b). Finally, Alabama will issue a license as a "licensed certified social worker" to anyone
who has a master's or doctoral degree, plus two years post-graduate experience. See § 34-30-
22(5)(c).
71. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.95.110 (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
43-403 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335.100 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:2706 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7053 fWest 1988
& Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 131 (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 337.615 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-22-301 (1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.530 (1995); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1907 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-39.1-8 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-102 (1990); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 50.015 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-60-205 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 3205 (1989 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.19.110 (West 1989 & Supp.
[Vol. 52:355
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Further, states also differ with respect to designations of social
workers. In Jaffee, the social worker earned Illinois licensure as a
"clinical social worker." This designation not only requires
heightened credentials, 72 it also defines the kind of practice the social
worker will have-in this case a clinical practice,' as opposed to
community organization, lobbying, public policy, or social service
administration. 4 Unlike Illinois, however, many states do not have a
distinct label for "licensed clinical social workers," even though the
credential requirements are similar.75
These differences in state designation of social workers, as well as
differences in minimum qualifications for licensure, raise questions
about the application of Jaffee. Given the Court's reference to the
"strict standards for licensure," could a social worker in Ohio, who is
licensed under that state's relatively lenient standards,76 invoke the
federal psychotherapist privilege? Is a "certified master social
worker" in Tennessee77 comparable to a "licensed clinical social
1997); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-5 (1993 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-106 (Michie
1996).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. Illinois law defines "clinical social work practice" as: "[P]roviding of mental health
services for the evaluation, treatment, and prevention of mental and emotional disorders in
individuals, families and groups based on knowledge and theory of psychosocial development,
behavior, psychopathology, unconscious motivation, interpersonal relationships, and
environmental stress." 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/3 (West 1994).
74. Illinois law defines the functions of "licensed [non-clinical] social workers" as
providing "social services to individuals, groups or communities in any one or more of the
fields of social casework, social group work, community organization for the social welfare,
social work research, social welfare administration, or social work education." 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 20/3 (West 1994). See also FRANK GIBELMAN, WHAT SOCIAL WORKERS DO 42 (1995).
75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-30-22 (1991) ("licensed graduate social worker" or
"licensed certified social worker"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2706 (West 1988) ("board
certified social worker," requiring a master's or doctoral degree, significant experience, and
passing an examination); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 131 (West 1996) ("certified social
worker," requiring a master's or doctoral degree and two years experience); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 37-22-301 (1995) ("licensed social worker"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-102 (1990)
("certified master social worker"); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 50.015 (West 1990 & Supp.
1997) ("licensed master social worker"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.19.110 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1997) ("certified social worker"); W. VA. CODE § 30-30-5 (1993 & Supp. 1996)
("graduate social worker" or "independent clinical social worker").
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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worker," such that Jaffee would squarely apply to a claim of
privilege? If qualifications imposed by state statute guide a court's
application of Jaffee, could not other mental health professionals,
who have earned state licensure with qualifications equal to those
required of master's degree-level social workers, also claim the
privilege?78
C. The Fallacy ofFunctionality
In Jaffee, the Court observed that social workers, like psychiatrists
and psychologists, perform psychotherapy." As providers of
psychotherapy services, the policies underlying the recognition of a
psychotherapist privilege-encouraging the use of mental health
services and promoting free and frank disclosures in treatment-
apply with equal force to social workers."0 In essence, the Court
focused on the service provided by the person, rather than the
credentials of the person performing the service.8 Yet, given the
78. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23.6-8-1 (West 1993) (requiring a master's or doctoral
degree and two years supervised clinical experience for licensure as a "marriage and family
therapist"); Mo. ANN. STAT. §337.510 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring a doctoral degree,
master's degree, or specialists degree for licensure as a "professional counselor'); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 37-23-202 (1995) (requiring a graduate degree in counseling plus 3,000 hours of
supervised clinical experience for licensure as a "professional counselor"); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:SB-18 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996) (requiring at least a master's degree in counseling plus
five years clinical experience for licensure as a "marriage counselor"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
503 (1996) (requiring a master's degree for licensure as an "employee assistance counselor");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-336 (1996) (requiring a master's degree plus 2,000 hours of clinical
experience for licensure as a "professional counselor"); OlO REV. CODE ANN. § 4757.07
(Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996) (requiring a master's or doctoral degree in counseling for
licensure as a "professional counselor"); OR. REV. STAT. § 675.715 (1995) (requiring a
graduate degree for licensure as a "professional counselor" or "marriage and family therapist");
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-75-100 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996) (requiring a doctoral degree or master's
degree for licensure as a "professional counselor" or "marriage therapist'); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 63-22-104 (1990) (requiring at least a master's degree for licensure as a "professional
counselor'); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 3265 (1989 & supp. 1997) (requiring a master's degree
for licensure as a "mental health counselor"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.19.120 (West 1989
& Supp. 1997) (requiring a master's or doctoral degree for licensure as a "mental health
counselor").
79. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931-32.
80. See id. See also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
81. In fact, the Court stated, "[d]rawing a distinction between the counseling provided by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol52/iss1/20
THE AFTERMATH OF JAFFE v. REDMOND
breadth of the term "psychotherapy," an entire cast of mental health
practitioners can claim to provide it.
For example, the Dictionary of Mental Health characterizes
"psychotherapy" as the "treatment of mental disorders and diseases
by mental, usually verbal, techniques, rather than physical means. 82
Similarly, the Social Work Dictionary defines a "psychotherapist" as
a "mental health professional who practices psychotherapy. The
major disciplines ... include social work, psychiatry, and clinical
psychology. Some members of other professions are also
psychotherapists, including nurse practitioners, physicians, family
therapy specialists, clergy, guidance counselors, and educators."83 As
these expansive definitions suggest, if the threshold inquiry for
recognizing the psychotherapist privilege is whether the professional
performs psychotherapy, then the privilege will swell among the
ranks of virtually all "helping professions."
III. THE CALL FOR STANDARDS
Against this backdrop of varying states' privilege laws, differing
state qualifications for licensure, and vague notions about the
meaning and functions of psychotherapy, federal courts will have to
construct the "full contours" of the psychotherapist privilege.
Conceivably, certain courts will adopt a restrictive approach, limiting
the privilege to the professionals discussed in Jaffee.84 Other courts
costly psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers
serves no discernible public purpose." Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 51
F.3d 1346, 1358 n.19 (7th Cir. 1995)).
82. RICHARD B. FISHER, THE DICTIONARY OF MENTAL HEALTH 204 (1980).
83. ROBERT L. BARKER, THE SOCIAL WORK DICTIONARY 304-05 (3d ed. 1995). The
Social Work Dictionary defines "psychotherapy as "a specialized, formal interaction between a
social worker or other mental health professional and client in which a psychotherapeutic
relationship is established to help resolve symptoms of mental disorder, psychosocial stress,
relationship problems, and difficulties coping in the social environment." Id. at 305.
84. Historically, the United States Courts of Appeal have taken a restrictive approach to
the psychotherapist privilege. At the time that the Court decided Jaffee, several circuits had
fully rejected the psychotherapist privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d. 1299
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the psychotherapist privilege does not apply in criminal child
sexual abuse cases); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the psychotherapist-privilege is not recognized in the context of grand jury investigations);
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will likely interpret Jaffee expansively, allowing anyone who
practices "psychotherapy" to claim the privilege. In the end, this
diversity of application will foster uncertainty among the federal
courts.
To promote the stability of the psychotherapist privilege, courts
must look to the spirit, and not the letter, of Jaffee. First, in light of
the Court's reference to strict licensure standards,85 federal courts
must impose standards that would qualify mental health professionals
to claim the privilege.86 For example, Congress has previously
defined "clinical social worker" as someone who possesses a master's
or doctor's degree, has performed two years of supervised clinical
experience, and is licensed or certified by the State in which services
are performed. 7 For other mental health providers, state licensure
requirements exact similar standards-master's or doctoral degree
plus clinical experience.88 In this way, the standards correspond
directly to the "strict standards for licensure" that the Jaffee Court
United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (holding that no psychotherapist-patient
privilege exists in federal criminal trials); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.
1976) (holding that no psychiatrist-patient privilege exists in federal criminal trials).
Even those circuits that did recognize a psychotherapist-privilege prior to Jaffee limited its
application to psychiatrists and psychologists. See, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 964 F.2d
1325 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing a psychotherapist privilege for communications made to a
psychiatrist); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing a psychotherapist
privilege for psychiatrists).
85. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
86. The notion that qualification standards should guide the application of a
psychotherapist privilege is hardly novel.
Extending a testimonial privilege to other professional counselors need not entail
greater definitional uncertainty costs .... Licensing and training requirements can
clearly identify the professional counselors protected by the privilege. Courts and
legislatures may use the possession of educational degrees, licenses, minimum number
of hours of training or affiliation with a licensed institution, to determine whether the
privilege protects communications with a counselor.
Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1551 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
In addition, Congress considered a similar proposal when it added "qual ied clinical social
workers" to the list of mental health providers eligible for reimbursement under the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Program. See 131 CONG. REc. 18094 (statement of Sen. Heinz).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(hh)(l) (1994).
88. See supra note 78.
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noted.89
Second, despite the difficulties with a functionality approach,
courts must consider the context in which the confidential
communications arose. When considering context, courts must
inquire about the proportion of practice that the mental health
professional devotes to counseling or psychotherapy. For example, if
the professional devotes a large part of her day to counseling clients,
the communications at issue likely ensued in the confidential haven
that the psychotherapist privilege protects.' Above all, courts must
consider the underlying purpose of the privilege-to facilitate
treatment by protecting free and frank communication.91 In light of
this purpose, the context in which communications are made is the
key consideration.
Finally, courts should refer to state privilege law in their
decisions. Generally, reference to state law will cut in favor of
extending the privilege, to ensure that it is coextensive with the state
privilege.9" Compatible federal-state psychotherapist privileges will
reinforce the client's expectation of confidentiality and thereby
promote the purpose of the privilege.93
89. Providers licensed pursuant to lenient state statutes would fall outside of the ambit of
the privilege.
90. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. By contrast, a licensed clinical social
worker who performs exclusively administrative functions at a mental health agency, could
hardly justify a claim of psychotherapist privilege because the communications could not likely
have arisen in a confidential setting.
91. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 27-31, 45-66 and accompanying text.
93. By contrast, incompatible federal-state privileges undermine full and frank
disclosures. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 263 (1996) (predicting that "[w]hen a patient
first seeks therapy and the therapist is faced with the ethical duty of discussing confidentiality
and its possible exceptions, it will be difficult to predict, if a lawsuit involving the patient
should occur, whether it will be in state court or federal court"). Thus, in circumstances where a
mental health professional can claim a privilege in state court but not federal court, or vice
versa, a client will not reveal sensitive information unless he can anticipate, in advance, where
he may be haled into court. Professor Winick suggests that this incongruity not only may
promote forum shopping, it may also undermine the therapeutic relationship. See id.; see also
Michele Smith-Bell & William J. Winslade, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Privilege in
Psychotherapeutic Relationships, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 180, 180 (1994) (stating that
"[c]lients assume or seek assurances that sensitive information will be a confidential
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CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, the state of the
psychotherapist privilege remains uncertain. Although the Court
embraced the privilege, its full contours have not yet taken shape.
Case by case, lower courts will construct its framework. Yet without
some blueprint to guide the courts the privilege is subject to widely
varying applications, as mental health professionals begin to claim it
in unprecedented numbers. Cryptic as the Jaffee opinion appears
regarding the mental health professionals eligible to invoke the
privilege, the factors that the Court considered offer some
rudimentary analytic tools. Ultimately, those tools will likely fashion
a broad mental health privilege, thereby eroding the narrow
construction once afforded to this testimonial privilege.
Merrily S. Archer"
communication to their [mental health professional], and unless they can trust their therapist
and rely on confidentiality, they are unlikely to cooperate fully in their therapy").
* J.D. & M.S.W. 1997, Washington University.
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